Security and isolation
The short version: your evidence is yours. Nothing telemetry-related is shared across customers, and the integrity chain starts on your side.
For who holds which key, and what Provantix can and cannot do to your records, see Trust. For how the evidence relates to SOC 2, ISO 42001, NIST AI RMF and the EU AI Act, see What the evidence supports.
Database isolation
Each organization gets a dedicated Postgres database with pgvector, physically separate from every other customer. No shared schema, no row-level filtering as a security boundary. Your telemetry, embeddings, findings and exports never touch another organization's store.
The platform database (accounts, orgs, sessions) holds no telemetry: only identities, organization records, and emitter-to-org routing mappings.
Integrity model
- Payloads are signed with your emitter key at capture, on your side, before transit.
- Signatures are verified at the edge before storage; tampered batches are rejected.
- Events chain per batch, connector, day and session; days are rooted (Merkle root) roughly 48 hours after close, and rooted days reject new ingest.
- Exports carry custody hashes an auditor re-computes independently, on their own machine, and a Provantix signature on the manifest that is checked against our published export keys. The recomputation needs no trust in us; the signature is what shows Provantix issued the export.
What the evidence proves, and what it doesn't
We would rather state the limit of the claim than have an auditor find it first.
Proven:
- A record was not altered, reordered or removed after your SDK or collector signed it. Tampering breaks the chain and is rejected at ingest.
- Gaps in the sequence are detected and reported as findings in exports, never smoothed over.
- Every record carries an attribution method and a confidence score. Records that cannot be linked to an agent are kept, not dropped, and are listed for review. Confidence reflects the evidence: a dedicated credential is treated as certain, while a shared credential or a timing-based match is lower and is labelled as such. Approval evidence appears only where the emitter sent it.
Not proven:
- That an agent reported every action it took. A sealed record proves what was sent, not that nothing was omitted.
- Closing that gap needs a second, independent vantage: the destination system's audit log, or the identity provider's. That is what the Microsoft connectors add today (Entra in beta, Microsoft 365 in validation), and what AWS, GCP and Kubernetes connectors will add next.
What we can and cannot see
- We hold your emitter public keys. Private keys are shown once at registration and never stored (BYOK never sends them at all).
- Event content arrives signed but in the clear unless you use field redaction; sensitive payload fields are then committed to as salted hashes instead of stored values.
- Prompts and model outputs are included only if you choose to send them; most teams don't.
Data handling
- Nothing telemetry-related persists on worker disks beyond transient processing; all state lives in your organization's database.
- Prompts and completions are kept as hashes only on the hosted OTLP intake; tool arguments ship as redacted, erasable summaries. The full statement is on the Content stance page.
- Every app response carries an enforced Content-Security-Policy plus
X-Frame-Options: DENY,X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff,Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-originand HSTS; fonts are self-hosted so no third party sees your page views. - Region selection, dedicated deployments, and writing exports/backups to customer-controlled storage buckets are on the enterprise roadmap.
Access control
- Sign-in: SSO (Entra, Google) with domain restriction, plus password with scrypt hashing for self-serve. Invite-only by default; open registration is off.
- Sessions: in-memory tokens, 30-day lifetime, server-side revocation on sign-out or password change.
- Admin actions (emitter register/revoke/delete, member invites, SSO config) are written to an audit log in your organization's database.